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Equitable Servitudes in Missouri'
S PECIFIC performance of restrictions upon property before
Tulk v. Moxhay. Before the decision in Tulk v. Moxhay2
a contract not to use land in a particular manner was
treated by equity courts in the same way as were other negative
contracts; if the plaintiff was so injured in the enjoyment of
his own land that damages at law did not furnish an adequate
remedy, equity would specifically enforce the contract by grant-
ing an injunction against the promisor. 3 The right thus to con-
trol the use of the property in the hands of the promisor can
hardly be classified as other than a property right,4 but since it
was enforcible only against the promisor it was a property right
that could be easily destroyed by any alienation of the property
and therefore was of relatively small value.
Tulk v. Moxhay. In Tulk v. Moxhay the plaintiff, who was
the owner of a piece of vacant ground in Leicester Square and
'This article, without special reference to Missouri law appeared in
the December, 1917, number of the Michigan Law Review and is reprinted
here by the courtesy of the editors of that review. The substance of the
article will also appear in a forthcoming book on Equity.
'(1848) 2 Phillips 774. Altho Tulk v. Moxhay is the leading case on
the subject, the point had already been decided in Whatman v. Gibson
(1838) 9 Simons 196. It was a sale of lots under a building scheme and
the restrictions were mutual. The court did not say anything about un-
just enrichment but merely pointed out the advantage to all the proprie-
tors of preserving the residential character of the neighborhood. The
case of Mann v. Stephens (1846) 15 Simons 377 also antedates Tulk v.
Moxhay; it varies in facts from Tulk v. Moxhay only in that the as-
signee entered into a similar covenant with the original covenantor. The
reasoning of the court is not reported.
'Martin v. Nutkin (1723) 2 P. Wms. 266 (promise not to ring a
bell) ; De Wilton v. Saxon (1801) 6 Ves. 106 (not to break up mowing
land).
'For example, it would logically pass on the plaintiff's death to his
heir rather than to his executor.
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also of several of the houses forming the square, sold the vacant
piece to one Elms, the deed containing a covenant by Elms that
he, his heirs and assigns would keep the piece of ground in its
then state, uncovered with any buildings, etc. The piece of land
passed by several mesne conveyances into the hands of the
defendant whose purchase deed contained no similar covenant
with his vendor, but he had notice of the original covenant when
he made his purchase. The covenant did not run at law against
the transferee of Elms because it was not connected with an
easement; furthermore, there was not only no common law prop-
erty right but there was not even a contract right against the
defendant, because the defendant had made no such covenant
with any one. The defendant having manifested an intention to
alter the character of the land and having asserted a right to
build thereon, the plaintiff sought and obtained an injunction
against his doing so. Such a right as equity declared belonged
to the plaintiff as against the defendant in this case was form-
erly called an equitable easement;5 It is now more common to
call it a covenant running with the land in equity.6 Since such
restrictive agreements are recognized by equity as creating prop-
erty rights in chattels as well as in land, while the common law
recognizes no easements or covenants as giving property rights
in chattels, it avoids confusion and misapprehension to call them
by the more general term of equitable servitudes.
Argument of the court in Tulk v. Moxhay. The court in Tulk
v. Moxhay seemed to rest their decision on the ground that if
such a right were not recognized and enforced there would be
"At common law there were five kinds of rights which one might
have in the land of another, i. e., rights which could be enforced against
the present or any future owner of the land: (a) legal charges, (b)
natural rights, such as rights of adjacent and subjacent support, (c)
easements, (d) profits, and (e) covenants running with the land. Equit-
able servitudes on land are similar in some respects to common law
easements, but there are some points of difference which will be pointed
out later in the article.
'In Missouri the more common term seems to be equitable ease-
ments. See Miller v. Klein (1913) 177 Mo. App. 557, 573, 160 S. W. 562.
In Zinn v. Sidler (1916) 268 Mo. 680, 689, 187 S. W. 1172 the court said:
"to create the limitation on the fee herein contended for, a covenant must
have been created, and it is not material whether it is termed an equitable
easement ................ or a servitude or a restrictive covenant."
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unjust enrichment at the expense of the plaintiff. Where the
parties in the different transactions after the purchase and cove-
nant by Elms supposed that the restriction was binding on trans-
ferees and fixed the price of the property accordingly, unjust
enrichment of the defendant would result if the restriction were
not enforced against him. And where those same parties sup-
posed that the restriction was not binding on transferees and
fixed the price according to that understanding, unjust enrich-
ment would result to the covenantor if the restriction were
enforced against the defendant. On the other hand, where
there is no misapprehension by the parties as to the legal rule
there is no unjust enrichment of any one because the price of
the property will be fixed according to the enforcibility or non-
enforcibility of the restriction. Consequently the decisions en-
forcing equitable servitudes against transferees can be rested on
the doctrine of unjust enrichment only in the rather abnormal
case where the parties were mistaken as to the law. Oddly
enough, it has been the orthodox doctrine-now happily disap-
pearing-that equity would give no relief against a mistake of
law.7 At the present day courts usually pay no attention to the
question of unjust enrichment in restrictive agreement cases.
A decision which shows that unjust enrichment is not the
basis of equitable servitudes is that of Rogers v. Hosegood.8
In that case it was held that a transferee of the covenantor was
entitled to en:-orce an equitable servitude on the defendant's
property tho the plaintiff knew nothing of the restriction when
he bought his property from the covenantee.
Real basis of Tulk v. Moxhay. The court in Tulk v. Moxhay
reasoned in a circle. Whether there was unjust enrichtnent of
the defendant at the expense of the plaintiff depended upon the
extent of the plaintiff's right; i. e., upon whether the plaintiff
could enforce the restrictive agreement against only the cove-
'The usual reason given for denying relief was that everyone was
presumed to know the law-an unfortunate misstatement of the rule that
ignorance of the law does not excuse one who has in some way incurred
a prima facie legal liability; for example, by committing a crime or tort
or a breach of contract. The rule should not be applied to one who has
incurred no such liability but seeks as plaintiff to be relieved from the
consequences of his error.
'(1900) 2 Ch. 388.
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nantor or whether he could also enforce it against the trans-
ferees of the land. Tho the reasoning in Tulk v. Moxhay is un-
sound the decision has been followed with practically no adverse
criticism and we must therefore find some other reason for it
so that we may fit it in with other parts of the legal system.
This reason is found in the inadequacy of the common law with
reference to rights in another's land,9 together with the almost
total lack of governmental supervision of building in Anglo-
American countries. Tho it might be much better to have muni-
cipal control of the use of land than to enforce restrictions im-
posed by private individuals, such control by private individuals
has on the whole been beneficial in the last half century's rapid
growth of cities.' 0
Who are bound by equitable servitudesf A common law
easement or profit was enforcible against any successor in title
tho he paid value in good faith. 11 But like other equitable rights
the benefit of an equitable servitude may not be enforced against
'The attitude assumed by Missouri courts toward the creation of
equitable servitudes has been stated as follows: "We concede that in
disposing of this question we must resolve any doubt in favor in the free
use of property. The law prefers that the use of land in any lawful
mode shall be unhampered by restrictive covenants; and, therefore,
courts decline to extend the stipulation limiting the use beyond the clear
meaning of the instrument when construed by the aid of the circumstances
surrounding its execution .................. But all courts profess to give
effect to all the plain intention of the parties in imposing such restric-
tions, and should live up to their profession in good faith instead of
seeking ingenious subtleties of interpretation by which to evade restric-
tions." Sanders v. Dixon (1905) 114 Mo. App. 229, 252, 89 S. W. 577.
1 The common law rules with reference to such rights were quite
rigid. For example, covenants running with the land bound only those
who succeeded to the estate of the covenantor and could be created only
where there was privity of estate; in this connection privity of estate
was said to exist where there was an easement of profit or where there
was the relation of grantor and grantee or that of lessor and lessee.
Covenants running with the land usually occurred in leases. The most
common ones running with the land against transferees were covenants
to pay rent, to repair, to rebuild, not to use premises in a certain way,
and not to assign the lease; those running with the land against the les-
sor's transferees were covenants to rebuild and covenants to renew the
lease. In England covenants probably do not run against the transferee
except in case of landlord and tenant. Tiffany, Real Property § 344.
'Easements and profits are, however, generally required by modern
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a bdna fide purchaser. 12 Tho a common law covenant running
with the land was enforcible only against one who succeeded to
the estate of the covenantor, there is no such limitation upon
the enforcement of equitable servitudes. In Abergarw Brew-
ery Co. v. Holmes's there was a covenant in a mortgage
not to buy wines, beers, etc., from any one except the mortgagee;
the restriction was enforced against an under-lessee with notice,
14
on the ground that it was the intention of the parties to bind
every one cla:iming under the mortgagor. In order to protect
the defendant in such a case the decree would of course be made
conditional upon the mortgagee's complying with his promise to
-furnish the liquor.
It has long been considered as settled that one who obtained
title from a trustee by adverse possession is entitled to hold it
against the cestui que trust even though he knew of the trust.15
On the other hand, one who obtains title by adverse possession
of property subject to an equitable servitude does not thereby
destroy the servitude even tho he had no notice of it.18 The only
way in which he can get rid of the servitude is by getting a re-
lease or by violating it and having the Statute of Limitations
registry acts irt this country to be recorded; hence, in the absence of
such a record, the bona fide purchaser will be protected. Armor v. Pye
(1881) 25 Kan. 731; Taylor v. Millard (1890) 118 N. Y. 244.
"Independent of the recording acts, common law rights were en-
forcible against: everyone while equitable rights were not enforcible against
bona fide purchasers. But wherever the registry statutes apply there is a
new line of division; if the right, whether common law or equitable, is
recorded according to the statutory provisions, it is enforcible against
all; if it is not so recorded, it is not enforcible against bona fide pur-
chasers or attaching creditors. It has been generally held that the regis-
try statutes allow and therefore require the recording of equitable servi-
tudes; where, therefore, they have been properly recorded they are en-
forcible regardless of actual notice. See 18 Harv. Law Rev. 535. Semple
v. Schwarz (1908) 130 Mo. App. 65, 72, 109 S. W. 633.
"'(1900) 1 Ch. 188.
"If he had not had notice, alter; Carter v. Williams (1870) L. R.
9 Eq. 678.
"Wych v. East India Co. (1734) 3 P. Wins. 309.
"In Re Nisbet and Potts' Contract (1906) 1 Ch. 386. It is not clear
whether the court did or did not regard notice as material. It should
have been regarded as immaterial. See 18 Harv. Law Rev. 608.
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run in his favor.17 The reason for the distinction seems to be
this: the holder of the equitable servitude is not interested in
the ownership of the servient property but merely in the way the
property is used; hence his rights have not been infringed till
the property is used in a way inconsistent with the servitude.
Or, to state it differently, while it is a breach of trust for the
trustee to convey the trust property to any one without the con-
sent of the cestui que trust or an order of court because he owes
a fiduciary duty to protect and administer the property for the
cestui, the holder of property subject to an equitable servitude
is not a fiduciary to that extent; he. may alien freely except that
he must not destroy the servitude by conveying to a bona fide
purchaser for value.' 8  A fortiori, one who has disseised the
owner of the servient property but has not yet acquired title is
bound by the servitude.19.
Influence of Tulk v. Moxhay on promisor's common law lia-
bility. Indirectly the decision in Tulk v. Moxhay has apparently
affected the promisor's common law liability. In order to make
it clear that the parties intended that the restriction should bind
transferees it is now usual for the promisor to promise not only
for himself but also for "his heirs, executors, administrators and
assigns". It seems now to be assumed that this form of under-
taking not only has the effect of making the restrictions enforce-
able in equity against transferees but also of making the promi-
sor himself liable at common law for any violation of the re-
striction by transferees.20 But a subsequent transferee with
'In this respect the holder of the equitable servitude is treated just
as if he had a common law easement of profit.
"
8His position is similar to that of the owner of land subject to an
equitable charge. The position of an unpaid vendor who has a right
to specific performance is also analogous.
*gMander v. Falcke (1891) 2 Ch. 554. The court mentions the fact
that he had notice; since he paid nothing for the land it would seem that
he ought to be bound even if he had not had notice.
"
0Hall v. Euin (1887) 37 Ch. D. 74, semble. Even before Tulk v.
Moxhay there was nothing to prevent: a promisor from undertaking to
be liable for acts done by his transferee; but at any time it would seem
that the promise should not be construed as including such an extensive
undertaking in the absence of clear evidence of intent. The mere fact
that he promises "for his executors and administrators" ought not to be
conclusive because the phrase may have been used as a mere form; his
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notice who does not bind himself by contract with reference to
the servitude 'is liable at common law for infringements by his
alienee only if he authorizes such infringements.
21
Who may enforce equitable servitudes. In determining the-
questions as to who may enforce equitable servitudes, equity will
usually carry out the intentions of the parties,-either express or
implied from all the circumstances of the case. While it is usu-
ally the intent to benefit not only the promisee as present owner
of land in the vicinity, but also to benefit any future owner of
such land, the parties may intend that the restriction be of less
duration. In Renals v. Cowlishaw2 2 the devisees in trust for
the sale of a mansion house and residential property known as
the Mill Hill estate and of certain pieces of land adjoining there-
to, sold and conveyed two of these adjoining pieces of land to
one Shaw, who covenanted, among other things, that the prop-
erty should be used for private dwellings only and not for any
trade or business. The conveyance did not state that the cove-
nant was for the protection of the residential property or make
any reference to the other adjoining pieces of land. The same
executor or administrator, of course, would be responsible in any event
for a breach committed by him while he held the land. In Clark v. De-
voe (1891) 124 N. Y. 120, a deed from the defendant of a lot in New
York City, after reciting that the grantee was the owner of an adjoining
lot, contained a covenant on his part, "for himself, his heirs, executors,
administrators, and assigns . . . that he will not erect or cause to
be erected, on s.aid lot, any building which shall be regarded as a nui-
sance, or which shall be occupied for any purpose which may render it
a nuisance". The defendant conveyed the adjoining lot to X by a deed
without any restriction; X erected a building which was used as a
livery stable. In an action on the covenant for damages the court held
that the covenant should not be so construed as to make the defendant
liable for the act of X, because of the "serious result to the grantor with
but slight benefit to the grantee". The dictum of the court that the
covenant did not create an equitable servitude so as to bind transferees
is, however, unsound; instead of requiring clear language to make the
restriction enfcrcible by injunction against transferees, it would and
should take clear language to limit the duration of the restriction to the
time that the covenantor is owner of the property, because of the com-
paratively small value of a restriction thus limited.
"Hall v. Ewin (1887) 37 Ch. D. 74.
2(1878) 9 Ch. D. 125. See also Badger v. Boardman (1860) 16
Gray 559.
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trustees also sold other pieces of land adjoining the Mill Hill
estate, similar conveyances being made. The trustees later sold
and conveyed the Mill Hill estate to Bainbrigge who died, and
his devisees in trust sold and conveyed to the plaintiff. The
pieces of land conveyed to Shaw came by several mesne con-
veyances into the hands of the defendants who carried on the
trade of wheelwrights, smiths, and bent timber manufacturers
and had erected a high chimney which emitted thick, black
smoke, thus injuring the residential character of the neighbor-
hood. The plaintiff was refused an injunction on the ground
that the restriction was not meant to benefit the property, i. e.,
the subsequent owners, but merely to benefit the covenantees
"to enable them to make the most of the property which they
retained".
If the intent of the parties was that the restriction should exist
only as long as the covenantees should hold the land, the decision
seems unimpeachable.23 But it ought to be pointed out that to
refuse to protect the transferees in such a case very largely
wipes out the commercial value of the restriction to the cove-
nantee unless the transferee erroneously supposed he would be
protected; for if at the time he contracted to buy he knew that
he could not as purchaser of the land enforce the restriction, he
obviously would pay little, if any, more than if there had been
no restriction. The chief value of the restriction, therefore, is
merely to keep the premises free till a sale could be made.2 4
On the other hand, if the intent was clear to limit the duration
of the restriction to the period of the trustees' ownership of the
Mill Hill estate and the purchasers of the lots thus understood
'In Coughlin v. Barker (1891) 46 Mo. App. 54, 59, one Carpenter
conceived the idea of establishing a residential section out of property
owned by himself and several other proprietors; while be had this idea
in mind, he sold some lots with restrictions; one of the lots is now
owned by the plaintiff and another by the defendant. It appeared that
his intention in inserting the restrictions was to retain control of the
mode of building with the view of carrying out the scheme of improve-
ment; having been compelled to abandon the scheme because unable to
get the cooperation of some of the other proprietors, the restrictions
were considered as having come to an end.
4This might be of sentimental value to the occupants, and safe-
guard their own comfort during their occupancy.
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it and bargained accordingly they are entitled to be free from the
restriction the moment the trustees convey the property.
25
The shift in the basis of equity jurisdiction against the promi-
sor. In the restrictive agreement cases before Tulk v. Moxhay
the equity courts based their jurisdiction upon the threatened
injury to the promisee's enjoyment of his own land in the vicinity
and upon the inadequacy of the common law remedy to compen-
sate for such an injury; and in Tulk v. Moxhay, where the court
assumed without argument that they would have had jurisdiction
to enjoin the promisor, there was such threatened injury. Since
Tulk v. Moxhay, however, there has been a change of attitude
upon the part of the courts that is none the less curious because
probably unconscious. In Peck v. Conway2 6 the master found
as a fact that the violation of the restriction "would be no appre-
ciable damage or injury to the plaintiff's premises". In discuss-
ing this, the court said: "Such an act of the defendants would
be against the restriction by which they are bound, and a viola-
tion of the rights of the plaintiff, of which she cannot be de-
prived, because in the judgment of others it is of little or no
damage". In other words, the court apparently regarded the
plaintiff as being substantially in the same position as if she had
bargained for the fee instead of merely for the power to con-
trol the use of the land.. That is, if she had contracted to buy the
fee it would. of course be no defense to a suit for specific per-
formance that the plaintiff would be as well or better off with-
out the land; the fact that it is land is a sufficient reason in it-
self. Similarly, having bargained for a restriction on the land,
she is now considered as having bought an interest in the land
and the fact that she would not otherwise be damaged if she did
get specific performance is no longer considered important.2
"
5If the restriction had been thus limited in duration, the lot pur-
chasers might have paid more than they would if the restriction was not
so limited but whether they paid more or less has no bearing on the en-
forcibility of the restriction.
"(1876) 119 Mass. 546.
'That the plaintiff need not show that the breach caused any dam-
age to his own land in the vicinity seems to be well settled in Missouri.
In Hall v. Wesster (1879) 7 Mo. App. 56, 62, the court said: "The ob-
jection may be founded on the merest whim". See also Kenwood Land
Co. v. Hancock Investment Co. (1913) 169 Mo. App. 715, 722, 155 S. W.
861; Sanders v. Dixon (1905) 114 Mo. App. 229, 240, 89 S. W. 577.
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In other words, she is considered as being the equitable owner of
an interest in the servient land from the moment the restriction
is intended to become operative.
May there be an equitable servitude in gioss? If the cove-
nantee need not show any threatened injury to his own premises
in order to get an injunction, but need only to show that he has
bargained for a restriction on the promisor's land, is it necessary
that the promisee should have any land in the vicinity which
might be benefitted? In Van Sant v. Rose2" the plaintiffs had
sold to the defendant Frank Rose a lot with a restriction against
erecting a flat or tenement building on the premises; the defend-
ant Frank Rose conveyed the premises to his wife, Alvida
Rose, and both defendants were proceeding to erect a flat build-
ing. In answer to a bill for an injunction the defendants set up
that the plaintiffs did not at the time of filing their bill or for a
long time prior thereto own other property anywhere in the
vicinity or neighborhood that would be affected by a breach of
the covenant. In giving the injunction the court argued that the
purchaser presumably paid a less price because of the restriction
and therefore the plaintiff ought to be allowed to enforce it to
prevent the defendants from being unjustly enriched; and that
the plaintiff's motive in creating and attempting to enforce the
restriction was of no importance. If this reasoning 29 were
followed to its logical conclusion the plaintiffs would have been
able to enforce a restriction even tho they had never owned any
land in the vicinity except that which they sold to the defendant
Frank Rose, 0 indeed, even if the plaintiffs had never owned
any land whatever but had bargained with the defendant in some
"(1912) 170 I11. App. 572, (1913) 260 Ii. 401.
"'While this reasoning is open to criticism the decision might con-
ceivably be supported on the ground that the plaintiff in requiring the
covenant and in suing for an injunction intended to represent and did
represent the property owners in the vicinity and that the injunction was
given to protect them. No hint of this appears in the case.
'"In the supposed case, as in the actual case of Van Sant vs. Rose,
the purchaser probably paid a less amount for the lot because of the
restriction, but how much is probably uncertain. If the injunction were
refused, would it be possible for the promisee to force the defaulting
promisor to make good this deduction in a suit in quasi-contract? It
would seem that this ought to be allowed though the Illinois Court of
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other way 3l for the restriction. Whether the equity courts will
take these last two steps and recognize to the full the doctrine of
equitable servitudes in gross32 remains to be seen. The decision
in Van Sant v. Rose is a striking example of the tendency of
equity in the United States to become mechanical.
While one having an estate in possession in the dominant prop-
erty can get an injunction without showing any damage to such
property 33 it has been held that one who has an estate in re-
mainder or reversion after a life estate and is not the promisee
must show that the breach would cause injury to his estate in
order to get an injunction. 4 This is analogous to common law
protection of property rights; a person in possession may bring
trespass for a violation of the possession and recover judgment
without proving any damage; the remainderman must bring an
action on the case and prove damage to his estate in the land in
order to recover. If the remainderman were also the promisee,
he would not: of course, be under the necessity of showing any
such damage if Van Sant v. Rosse should be followed.
Equitable servitudes attaching to after acquired property. In
Lewis v. Golner35 one Gollner bought a lot in a residential sec-
Appeals in Van Sant v. Rose said: "there can be no adequate recovery
at law"; the uncertainty of the amount ought not to be considered an
insuperable obstacle to such relief. And if he can get such relief, is not
this an argument against allowing the injunction to one who no longer
has any econotnic interest in the neighborhood to be protected?
'lf the defendant has bargained for a cash payment, the plaintiff's
right in quasi-contract seems clear.
"May the same equitable servitude be treated as both appurtenant
and in gross? For example, suppose that in Van Sant v. Rose the plain-
tiffs at the time of the sale to Frank Rose had other property in the
vicinity which they intended to protect by the restriction; later they sell
this other property to X who does not wish to enforce the restriction;
may the plainiffs do so? In such case it might well be said that the
plaintiff should not be entitled because if the defendant should be en-
riched it would be at the expense of X and not of the plaintiffs. But
suppose that the promise was made expressly for the benefit of the
plaintiffs' other land and also for the benefit of the plaintiffs personally?
If we follow the reasoning of Van Sant v. Rose it is difficult to see
how the plaintiffs could be denied an injunction.
"Dickenson v. Grand Junction Canal Co. (1852) 15 Beav. 260.
"'Iohnstona v. Hall (1856) 2 K. & J. 414.
"'(1891) 129 N. Y. 227.
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tion, intending to erect a tenement building; the plaintiff, repre-
senting persons who owned residences in the neighborhood,
sought to buy him out and did buy him out, for the sole pur-
pose of saving the neighborhood from flats. The plaintiff paid
Gollner $6,000 more than Gollner had agreed to give for the lot,
the latter agreeing that "he would not construct or erect any
flats in plaintiff's immediate neighborhood or trouble him any
more". Immediately afterward Gollner bought a lot diagonally
opposite his first purchase and began erecting a seven-story flat.
Plaintiff's attorney threatened action and one of the material-
men refused to continue to supply him further, so Gollner sold
and conveyed the premises to his wife who took with knowledge
of all the facts and with the intention of protecting her husband.
The plaintiff sought an injunction against Gollner and his wife;
the lower court refused to give it but this was reversed by the
upper court.. It is to be observed here that at the time the con-
tract was entered into, the defendant Gollner had no land to
which an equitable servitude could attach and consequently there
was, strictly speaking, no equitable servitude at that time. The
court seemed to think that the contract created such a situation
between the parties that an equitable servitude came into exis-
tence the moment that Gollner acquired a piece of land in the im-
mediate neighborhood and would therefore be enforcible against
a purchaser of the land with notice of the facts. This is some-
what analogous to the creation of a trust of after acquired prop-
erty.36 The actual facts of the case did not require such reason-
ing; it was clear that Gollner's wife was colluding with him to
help him escape the consequences of his contract and even if the
obligation of Gollner be considered as merely personal, dam-
ages at law being inadequate, the court properly enjoined the
wife as well as Gollner. But if Gollner transferred to a stranger
who had no intent to aid Gollner to evade his contract but did
know the facts, such a transferee could be enjoined only on the
ground suggested by the court.
Restrictive agreements as to a business. Tho the great bulk
of equitable servitudes consist of restrictions placed on one piece
"Pratt v. Tuttle (1884) 136 Mass. 233.
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of land, for the benefit of another piece of land,8 7 they may be
imposed for the benefit of a business and if so intended the bene-
fit will pass to the assignee of the business.38  Similarly, the
benefit of a personal covenant not to compete with the promisee
in business will pass to the assignees of the promisee, if so in-
tended.3 9 On the other hand, the restriction may be enforced
against the assignees of the covenantor's business. In Wilkes v.
Spooner40 X sold to the plaintiff his business of general butcher,
covenanting not to establish a rival business within three miles.
X also conducted a pork business at a nearby shop which he held
on lease. This lease X surrendered in order that his son, the
defendant, who. bought the pork business with notice of this
covenant, might get a new lease and set up a business to compete
with the plaintiff's. The real reason for enjoining the defend-
ant was that he was the assignee of the father's business--not
that he happened to occupy the same building; tho the court
seemed to put it on the latter ground, it is difficult to see how
X, having only a term for years, could create an equitable servi-
tude on the land which would outlast his lease.
The formality essential to the creation of equitable servitudes.
Altho equitable servitudes are treated as technical property
rights; i. e., they are enforced tho the plaintiff would suffer
no damage to other land by a breach,-no particular formality
is required for -their creation. Thus not only is a seal not neces-
sary4 ' but there is a conflict of authority as to whether any
written memorandum at all is necessary to comply with the
Statute of Frauds. 42 Furthermore, it is not important whether
"This is a ccnvenient figure of speech; legal rights and obligations
may strictly be predicated only of human beings.
uAbergarw Brewery Co. v. Holmes (1900) 1 Ch. 188.
"Francisco v. Smith (1894) 143 N. Y. 488. As the court pointed out,
since the benefit passed to the assignee of the business, no injunction can
be granted if the business is discontinued; but a discontinuance does not
put an end to the right but merely suspends the enforcement, so that if
the business is later resumed the covenantor can then be enjoined.
Clegg v. Hands (1890) 44 Ch. D. 503.
4(1911) 2 K. B. 473, 24 Harv. Law Rev. 574.
4 Dorr v. Harrahan (1869) 101 Mass. 531.
'See Browne, Statute of Frauds (4th ed.) § 269; but see 5 Harv.
Law Rev. 278: "If the acts and the land are stated in writing the court
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the restrictions take the form of covenants,43 reservations, or
conditions. 44
But altho form may not be essential it is as a practical matter
very important in drawing up instruments containing restric-
tions that express stipulations be made. If the covenantee wishes
to make certain that his transferees may take advantage of the
restriction, the safest way is to have an express provision in the
deed that it is for the benefit of the land; if he fails to do this,
it will then become a question of construction for the court. In
Tallmadge v. East River Bank45 it was held that if the sale was
made with reference to a plat showing the restriction, that was
enough. 46 And in Peck v. Conway47 and Barrow v. Richard48
it was decided that if on a fair construction of the whole instru-
ment an intention to benefit the land appeared, that was suffi-
cient.49  If the seller int ended to sell all the property and not
retain any himself, this fact tends strongly to show that the re-
striction was meant to benefit the future owners of the land.50
considers the statute satisfied, and will gather the other terms of the re-
striction by reading the writing as a whole in the light of surrounding
circumstances".
"Peck v. Conway (1876) 119 Mass. 546.
"Parker v. Nightingale (1863) 6 Allen 341; 5 Harv. Law Rev, 277.
'"(1862) 26 N. Y. 105.
"In Zinn v. Sidler (1916) 268 Mo. App. 680, 187 S. W. 1172, one
Wright had laid out and platted thirty-one acres in lots, acknowledged
the plat and had it recorded; across the lots and blocks on this plat
checked or broken lines were drawn designated as "building lines"; the
court held that this was insufficient evidence of Wright's intention to
impose restrictions, evidently agreeing with the defendant's contention
that the lines constituted merely a suggestion to the future owners of
property in the addition. For a comment upon this case, see 15 Law
Series, Missouri Bulletin, 19.
'(1876) 119 Mass. 546.
"(1840) 8 Paige 351.
"5 Harv. Law Rev. 278: "The ownership and character of buildings
in the neighborhood, plans, building schemes, the existence of similar re-
strictions upon other lots, even parol agreements among neighbors may
be shown as bearing upon the probable intention of the contracting
parties".
"See the discussion of mutual covenants, post. And see Nottingham
Co. v. Butter (1886) 16 Q. B. D. 778. In Meriweatherv. Joy (1900) 85 Mo.
App. 634, the vendor at the time of the sale to the defendant, had no
EQUITABLE SERVITUDES IN MISSOURI I1
Whether equitable servitudes may require affirmative action.
With the exception of the spurious common law easement of
fencing, common law easements require no action on the part
of the owner Df the servient property.51 An equitable servitude,
on the other hand, may impose a duty to act tho the court may as
a practical matter refuse relief. 52 If the act is of such a nature
as to require little or no supervision, enforcement will be de-
creed; e. g. in Whittenton Mfg. Co. v. Staples,5 3 where the cove-
nant was to pay the grantor or his assignee one-fifth of flowage
damages caused by a reservoir dam. On the other hand, if the
act is such as to require a great deal of supervision, equity will
usually refuse relief 54 as a matter of the balance of convenience
property fronting on the street, having already conveyed what he had
there to his grandchildren without restriction; the court very properly
argued that these circumstances tended to show that he meant the build-
ing line restric:ion to protect the grandchildren, of whom the plaintiff
was one.
"Tiffany, Real Property § 312.
12Because of the difficulty of supervision and the interference with
the personal liberty of the defendant. It is a question to be decided as
a matter of the balance of convenience. See 5 Harv. Law Rev. 278, 279.
"(1895) 16[ Mass. 319. See also Atlanta, etc. Ry Co. v. McKinney
(1906) 124 Ga. 929, in which a covenant to convey water to the covenan-
tee's residence was enforced against the covenantor's assignees. In
Clegg v. Hands (1890) 44 Ch. D. 503, a covenant by a lessee to buy beer
only of the lessor was indirectly enforced in favor of the lessor's as-
signees by enjoining the lessee from buying beer elsewhere. It thus com-
bines the peculiar principles of both Tulk v. Moxhay and Lumley v.
Wagner (1852) 1 De Gex, M. & G. 604. See 14 Harv. Law Rev. 301.
"The question of giving affirmative relief may also arise where the
defendant has already violated the restriction by erecting a building be-
fore the plaintiff asks for relief; if the removal of the building would
cause damage to the defendant wholly disproportionate to the damage
caused to the plaintiff by the breach, the court will exercise its discre-
tion in refusing such relief. In Kenwood Land Co. v. Hancock Invest-
ment Co. (1913) 169 Mo. App. 715, 155 S. W. 861, the defendant had
violated a restriction by building a duplex house; the court held that
the proper relief was not to order its removal but to decree that it should
be occupied by only one family until the restriction should expire at the
end of fifteen years. In Sanders v. Dixon (1905) 114 Mo. App. 229, 254,
89 S. W. 577, the court held that the defendant should have the oppor-
tunity to alter the building so as to make it a single residence before
ordering him tc remove it; and in Thompson v. Langan (1913) 172 Mo.
App. 64, 154 S. W. 808, an order for the removal of a building erected
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unless the hardship on the plaintiff would be very great if relief
were denied. 5
Mutual covenants in general building schemes. Another illus-
tration of the non-technical way in which equitable servitudes
may be created is shown in the rules applying to mutual cove-
nants in general building schemes. In Nottingham Patent Brick
and Tile Co. v. Butler"6 thirteen lots were put up at auction, sub-
ject to certain sale conditions as to the use of the land, which
were also expressed in the deeds of conveyance to the various
purchasers. It was held that since the grantor intended to sell
and did sell the whole property, the, restrictions were evidently
meant to benefit each lot as against all the others, and equity
would effectuate this intention.57 In Barrow v. Richard-s it did
not appear that the vendor intended to sell all his property in the
vicinity, but in each of the conveyances which he made there was
included a condition against the property being used for "any
other manufactory, trade, or business whatsoever which should
or might be in anywise offensive to the neighboring inhabitants".
This was held to be sufficient to show an intention to benefit
each of the lots sold 5 9 against the others. The court in this case
for a hotel was denied if it could be so changed as to comply with the
restriction. In Forsee v. Jackson (1915) 192 Mo. App. 408, 182 S. W.
783, the defendant had erected a building with a bay window extending
nine inches beyond the building line; an affirmative decree for the re-
moval of the bay window was denied because of the great damage it
would cause to the defendant. In such a case, it would seem that the
court should have given to the plaintiff, in lieu of the injunction, com-
pensation for the plaintiff's equitable property right which is thus con-
fiscated.
"Haywood v. Brunswick Building Society (1881) 8 Q. B. D. 403
(covenant to keep in repair not enforced against assignee).(1886) 16 Q. B. D. 778.
'The fact that the lots were not sold on the same day and the fur-
ther fact that some were sold at private sale were held to be unimportant
since it was a general scheme. See Collins v. Castle (1887) 36 Ch. D.
243. Even if there is no general scheme the restrictions may be mutual,
if it can be shown from some other source that the vendor intended the
covenant to bind each lot in favor of all the rest. Doerr v. Cobbs (1909)
146 Mo. App. 342, 351, 123 S. W. 547.
'(1840) 8 Paige 351.
"As to whether other "neighboring inhabitants" not purchasers from
the vendor, might enjoin as expressly intended beneficiaries of the con-
tract, quaere.
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admitted that the plaintiff could not recover at law,60 and it
must be admitted that it would have been difficult if not impos-
sible to have worked out any principle at common law which
would allow the purchaser of the lot first sold to enforce against
a purchaser of another lot a covenant which was not in existence
at the time of the sale of the first lot. Equity, however, is able
to and does carry out the intention of the parties 61 by allowing
the purchaser of any lot to enforce the restriction62 against the
6 This was before the famous case of Lawrence v. Fox (1859) 20
N. Y. 268 which gave a payment beneficiary of a contract a right to sue
thereon; but it is at least doubtful whether the present New York law
would regard the plaintiff as coming within the principle of that case.
'"See 6 Harv. Law Rev. 290; 12 Col. Law Rev. 159. In Child v.
Douglas (1854) Kay 560, it is suggested that the later purchasers are
assignees from the vendors of the benefit of the covenants made by the
earlier purchasers, but this does not explain the obligation of the later
purchasers to the earlier. In Parker v. Nightingale (1863) 6 Allen 341,
it was held that since the vendor was only a dry trustee of the covenants
for each of the purchasers he need not be joined. The purchasers would
seem to be beneficiaries of the contract rather than cestuis que trust,
however. That mutual covenants may exist without a sale but merely
by agreement between two owners of neighboring property, see Trus-
ees of Columbia College v. Lynch (1877) 70 N. Y. 440.
"In Doerr v. Cobbs (1909) 146 Mo. App. 342, 351, 123 S.W. 547 the
court held that if a senior grantee wished to enforce a restriction against
a junior grantee, stronger evidence of intention to benefit him was nec-
essary than in the case where the parties were reversed. "A difference
in principle can be discerned between the case of a grantee holding
premises under a subsequent conveyance from the common source of
title and seeking to enforce a covenant restricting the use of nearby
premises, contained in a deed of prior date, from the case of a man who,
holding title under a prior grant, seeks to enforce a covenant contained
in a deed later than the one under which he claims. The junior grant
is supposed to have been made for a consideration enhanced by the cir-
cumstance that the use in obnoxious ways of property adjacent to or in
the neighborhood. of that conveyed had been restrained in previous con-
veyance; or, to 'borrow the pungent phrase of Lord Hatherly, in Child
v. Douglas, Kay 560, the kiter grantee 'must be said to have bought the
benefit of the fcrmer purchaser's covenant.' And, as no injustice to the
former purchaser will be occasioned by holding him to the observance of
the restriction in his deed, it is reasonable to allow any property-owner
who bought late:r from the same vendor, and who will be damaged by a
breach of the restriction, to restrain a breach. But the same reasoning
does not obtain as widely in favor of permitting a senior grantee of one
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purchaser of any other lot.6 3 In such a building scheme, how-
ever, each lot is treated as a unit; hence, if it is later divided,
one part of the lot can not enforce against the other part,6 4 but
each part may enforce the restriction against any other lot or
part thereof or vice versa.
While it seems to be an unsettled question whether in the ordi-
nary case a covenant will bind after acquired property of the
covenantor, 65 it has recently been held in a general building
scheme case that after acquired property may be bound at least
in the hands of a transferee. In Schmidt v. Palisade Supply Co.,66
X, the owner of land, projected a definite building scheme,
including in his project land to which he had no title. He later
acquired this land and conveyed a part of it to the defendant,
subject to the restrictions of the general plan. It was held that
a purchaser of part of the land originally owned could enforce
the restriction against the defendant.6 7
lot to insist on a restrictive covenant inserted in a later conveyance of
another lot, inasmuch as the covenant to be enforced, was not in ex-
istence when the senior grantee bought, and the presumption that he
bought in reliance on its protection does not arise naturally. In such an
instance it must appear in some manner from the deed to the senior
grantee, or dehors said deed, that the vendor intended the covenants to
bind himself and those who thereafter should derive title from him to
property in proximity to the complainants". If there had been a general
building scheme, however, there would have been no occasion for mak-
ing the above distinction because the general scheme would supply the
evidence of intention to benefit each lot as against every other lot, re-
gardless of the time of sale.
"Tho equitable servitudes have grown out of the specific perform-
ance of contracts, it may be questioned whether it is at the present time
necessary for the existence of equitable servitudes that there be any
common law contract right against any one. For example, if A has only
ten lots and he sells them all at one auction according to a building
scheme, it is at least doubtful whether there is any personal liability on
any one. If there is not, then the situation is analogous to a conveyance
of land with a reservation of a common law easement or of a rent charge.
"King v. Dickeson (1889) 40 Ch. D. 596; Barney v. Everard (1900)
67 N. Y. Supp. 535. See 7 Col. Law Rev. 623.
'See ante.
0(1912) 84 Att. 807 (N. J.); 13 Col. Law Rev. 7.7.
'It is an interesting question whether X himself would be bound by
the general restrictions as to the after acquired land. There seem to be
no cases.
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Failure of purpose of restriction. Tho the plaintiff may get
an injunction without showing damage to his other property, he
may be refused preventive relief where it is not possible there-
by to secure to the plaintiff the benefit intended. In Jackson v.
Stevenson,68 lots had been sold in 1865 under a general building
scheme with restrictions against the use of the lots -for trade or
business purposes. After 1873 the character of that portion of
the city changed from a residential to a business district. In
1891 the plaintiff sought an injunction but was refused because
the court's decree could not restore the residential character of
the neighborhood, and would therefore be practically futile.
The court, how-ever, did not dismiss the bill but retained it for
the sake of assessing damages. This is to be justified only upon
the ground that the servitude has not actually come to an end but
that it is merely unenforcible because of practical difficulties.
The court in McClure v. Lcaycraft, supra, seemed to proceed
upon the same theory in suggesting that the plaintiff could re-
cover damages at law. It is difficult to understand this last
suggestion because the defendant was not the original cove-
nantor but a purchaser from him; but it is understandable to
allow the plaintiff a sum of money in equity as compensation
for an equitable property right which the equity court in its dis-
u(1892) 156 Mass. 496. See also McClure v. Leaycraft (1905) 183
N. Y. 36, 19 Harv. Law Rev. 305. See also Columbia College v. Thacher
87 N. Y. 311, where the change had come about after suit brought but
before decree. There seems to be an unfortunate tendency in Missouri
to deal with this question in a mechanical way. In Thompson v. Langan
(1913) 172 Mo. App. 64, 83, 154 S. W. 808, the court said: "But it is
claimed that the general plan upon which Hamilton Place was laid out
and the general object of its creation had been abandoned and that con-
ditions in the neighborhood had changed, and that therefore, all of the
restrictions fell in. We considered both of these questions in Spahr v.
Cape, [1909] 143 Mo. App. 114, 122 S. W. 379, and again in Noel v. Hill,
[19111 158 Mo. App. 426, 138 S. W. 364. In the last named case, as here,
it was in evidence that on adjoining streets, and across the same street,
there were no restrictions, that there were stores and shops across that
and on streets running to the north of and bordering on the restricted
locality, the restricted section covering but one city block; in short, that
outside of the restricted district, business had grown up and the neigh-
borhood had changed. We held in each of the cases, as in others refer-
red to, that these facts did not put an end to the restrictions. We hold,
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cretion refuses to enforce.69 In Amerman v. Dean70 the trial
court having awarded $1,500 in lieu of an injunction the upper
court ordered that the plaintiff should not get the amount unless
she executed to the defendant a release of the servitude.
Public policy against enforcing restriction. A contract not to
compete with the promisee may be invalid at law and therefore
not enforcible in equity because contrary to public policy 71 in
favor of freedom. For the same reason a court of equity may
refuse to enforce an equitable servitude. In Norcross v. James,
72
on the application of those principles to the facts here, that the restric-
tions here invoked are not removed by reason of any change of condi-
tions". See also Bohn v. Tyrol Investment Co. (1913) 178 App. 1, 160
S. W. 588. If the restricted district is small and surrounded by unre-
stricted territory which is given over to business buildings, it seems of
doubtful propriety to continue the enforcement of the restrictions. On
the other hand the court is quite right in saying that the mere fact that
the restricted lot has become more valuable for business than for residen-
tial purposes is not a sufficient reason for denying an injunction. Noel
v. Hill (1911) 158 Mo. App. 426, 450, 138 S. W. 364; Spaln v. Cape (1909)
143 Mo. App. 114, 122 S. W. 379.
"'In Sanders v. Dixon (1905) 114 Mo. App. 229, 256, 89 S. W. 577,
the defendant contended that the time limit for the restrictions had ex-
pired. The court said: "If, in truth, the restrictions have lapsed, there
is no cause to alter the building as it stands for it might immediately be
converted into a flat without violating the covenant ......... If the re-
strictions have lapsed, the plaintiffs may be entitled to redress for dam-
ages sustained from the construction and maintenance of the flats-re-
dress which a court of equity would have power to award as essential
to complete justice, in the present case wherein the plaintiffs have shown
an equity".
7°(1892) 132 N. Y. 355.
'"Whether, in order to be valid, restrictions must be i easonable can hardly
be said to be settled in Missouri. In Compton Hill Improvement Co. v.
Strauch (1911) 162 Mo. App. 76, 87, 141 S. W., 1159, the court suggests
that they must; on the other hand, in Miller v. Klein (1913) 177 Mo.
App. 557, 571, 160 S. W. 562, the court said: "It is conceded by both
parties that it is not necessary for the plaintiff to make any showing
that the restrictions as originally contained in the deeds are reasonable
or in the opinion of the court desirable". The latter case is an illustra-
tion of the unfortunate tendency to deal with equity questions in a
formal, mechancial way. It is at least doubtful whether the economic
interest of vendors will prove to be a sufficient safeguard against impos-
ing undesirable restrictions.
"2(1885) 140 Mass. 188.
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one K conveyed to F a quarry, retaining the surrounding land.
In the conveyance there was a covenant not to open any quarry
on the land retained. Plaintiff, a subsequent transferee of the
quarry, sought to have the covenant enforced against a subse-
quent transferee of the surrounding land. Relief was refused
on the ground that it would tend to create a monopoly for the
plaintiff: Whether, however, the restriction is against public
policy ought to be determined on the facts of each case ;73 there
is nothing in the report of the case to show that the restriction
would injure the public, 74 tho that might have been the fact;
e. g. if the stone were a peculiar sort which the public could not
get on the market. If, however, the stone were quite common
and easily procured by the public, there would seem to be no
satisfactory reason for refusing relief.
75
Equitable servitudes upon and for the benefit of chattels. It
may be very important for the vendor or lessor of a chattel to
impose restrictions upon the use of the chattel in the hands of
the lessee and his assignees or upon the sale of it in the hands of
the purchaser and his assignees. A few cases have enforced
such restrictions, thus carrying out the intent of the parties. In
"In Noel v. Hill (1911) 158 Mo. App. 426, 443, 138 S. W. 364, the
defendant contended that the restriction against the carrying on of busi-
ness violated the so-called rule against perpetuities which in substance
requires that interest in property must vest within twenty-one years
after lives in being at the creation of the interest. The court's holding
the contention invalid was proper because the interests of both the domi-
nant and servient tenants are vested at once, just as in the case of the
creation of a common law easement. The reason given by the court for
the decision o:a this point was that there were persons in being who
could convey an absolute' fee in possession; while this is true it does not
really state an adequate reason; the mere fact that there are persons who
could convey an absolute fee does not prevent a future contingent inter-
est from being bad within the so-called rule against perpetuities.
"
4In Burdell v. Grandi (1907) 152 Cal. 376, the owner of a large tract
of land divided it into lots and conveyed them to different purchasers
by deeds containing covenants by the vendors not to sell intoxicating
liquors; the purpose was to protect his own saloon from competition.
The covenants were held void as creating a monopoly. See 21 Harv.
Law Rev. 450. See also Brewer v. Marshal (1868) 19 N. J. Eq. 537.
"In the very similar case of Hodge v. Sloan (1887) 107 N. Y. 244,
relief was given; the question of monopoly seems not to have been raised.
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Murphy v. Christian Press Association Publishing Co.7 6 the
plaintiff bought of the Catholic Publication Society a set of
electrotype plates, covenanting that it would not sell plates to
any one else, and that it would not sell books at less than a cer-
tain price. Later the Society was dissolved and the receivers
sold the plates to the defendant who knew of the agreement.
The defendant published and sold books at a less price than the
Society agreed to sell; the plaintiff was granted an injunction.
Here the covenantee was not the business because the defendant
did not buy out the business but merely the plates and copy-
right, so that the dominant property here was the plates sold
and the servient property was the plates retained. It is to be ob-
served that the chattels involved here were protected by the
copyright law; it is also held that the price of patented articles
may be similarly controlled.7 7 It was for a while contended 78
that the same rules should be applied to proprietary articles such
as so-called patent medicines where there was a trade secret in-
volved; but the present tendency is in favor of holding restric-
tions in such cases invalid.79  Where neither statutory nor
natural monopoly is involved the public interest in free trade in
chattels should a fortiori prevent the upholding of such restric-
tions.
Effect of plaintiff's default or acquiescence. Like other in-
corporeal property rights, an equitable servitude may be released
by the owner of the dominant property and thereby extinguish-
T(1899) 38 N. Y. App. 426. See also N. Y. Bank Note Co. v. Ham-
ilton Bank Co. (1895) 83 Hun: 593; 20 Harv. Law Rev. 335.
'See Park & Sons Cc. v. Hartman (1907) 153 Fed. 24, and cases
cited.
"
8See 17 Harv. Law Rev. 415.
"Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co. (1911) 220 U. S. 373,
Price Restriction on the Re-sale of Chattels, by William J. Shroeder, 25
Harv. Law Rev. 59-69. Mr. Shroeder's argument is that while the pro-
tection of the statutory monopoly of the patentee and copyright owner
extends to the chattels produced thereunder, the natural monopoly of the
possessor of a secret exists only so long as the secret is preserved and
has no relation to the article manufactured by its use when once it is
offered as a subject of commerce; that while the owner of the statu-
tory monopoly gives the benefit of his discovery to the public after a
certain period, the owner of a trade secret gives nothing to the public
for his protection against fraudulent discovery or disclosure.
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ed;80 whether the failure of the purpose of a restriction puts an
end to the right or merely to the plaintiff's equitable remedy
thereon has already been discussed81 A plaintiff may, of course,
be estopped8 2 by observing without objection the defendant's
expenditure of money in violating the restriction, tho it is at
least doubtful whether this would bar the plaintiff from object-
ing to further violations. 8 3 Where the restrictions are mutual a
plaintiff may be barred because he has himself violated the re-
striction upon his own land;84 and where a landlord imposed
building restrictions upon several tenants for their mutual bene-
fit as well as his own and so failed to enforce them against some
of the tenants that the object of the restriction was defeated it
was held that he had lost the power to enforce against others.8 5
"Tiffany, Real Property § 275.
"See ante.
*"In Hall v. Wesster (1879) 7 Mo. App. 56, 63, there is a dictum that
if the plaintiff had known that the defendant was erecting the buildings
he might have been estopped. In Miller v. Klein (1913) 177 Mo. App.
557, 160 S. W. 562, the court held that mere silence and inaction in al-
lowing other persons to erect flats on adjoining land did not amount to
an estoppel unless it amounted to a .fraud on the plaintiff. And in
Thompson v. Langan (1913) 172 Mo. App. 64, 86, 154 S. W. 808, the
court took the position that permitting violations by others might show
abandonment but not estoppel.
"Whitney v. Union Ry. Co. (1858) 11 Gray 359.
"Coates v. Cullingford (1911) 131 N. Y. Supp. 700; 12 Col. Law
Rev. 158. In Compton Hill Improvement Co. v. Strauch (1911) 162 Mo.
App. 76, 141 S. W. 1159, several plaintiffs sued for an injunction; one
of them had violated the restriction but the others had not; it was held
those who had not violated the restriction were entitled to the injunc-
tion.
. Roper v. Williams (1822) Turn. & R. 18. See also Ocean City
Ass'n. v. Chalfant (1903) 65 N. J. Eq. 156 (restrictions against trade or
business on SurLday) ; 17 Harv. Law Rev. 138; 4 Col. Law Rev. 73. This
is probably what the court had in mind in Thompson v. Langan (1913)
172 Mo. App. 54, 86, 154 S. W. 808, when it said that such a defense
amounted to abandonment and not to estoppel; that is, that if the object
of the restrictions had thus been defeated, it was not necessary to show
that the defendiant had changed his position in reliance upon the plain-
tiff's implied representations.
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While mutual restrictions may come to an end by mutual aban-
donment, a modification of the restrictions may be made by all




8See Sanford v. Keer (1912) 80 N. J. 240, where it was held that
building a garage on that portion of the lot intended for a dwelling house
was not protected by a modification allowing necessary or desirable out-
buildings. In Scharer v. Pantler (1907) 127 Mo. App. 433, 105 S. W.
668, the grantor sold several lots with a building line restriction of
twenty-five feet. Soon afterward the grantor and grantees erected
buildings on a fifteen foot line. It was held that this was an abandon-
ment, not a modification, and that the defendant could not be enjoined
from erecting a building only five feet from the street.
